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Abstract:   
The evaluation of development processes and of public policies often involves 
comparisons of social states in which populations differ in size and longevity. This 
requires social evaluation principles to be sensitive to both the number and the length of 
lives. This paper explores the use of axiomatic and welfarist principles to assess social 
welfare in that framework. It attempts to overcome some of the limits of existing methods 
in the literature, in particular by avoiding a temporal repugnant conclusion, by neither 
penalizing nor favoring life fragmentation, and by satisfying critical-level temporal 
consistency. It does this by characterizing a critical-level lifetime utility function that 
values life periodically. To address some of the controversies on discounting utilities 
across time, two alternative versions of the function are developed, one with discounting 
and one without. 
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1 Introduction
1.1 Context
All around the world, development is associated with improved longevity and slower de-
mographic growth. Global average life expectancy at birth has risen from 63 years in
1980 to 70 years in 2011, while the global annual population growth rate has fallen from
1.8 % to 1.2% during the same period. Developed countries have already crossed what is
commonly called the critical point of a “demographic transition.” Such a critical point is
characterized by relatively high longevity and by relatively low fertility. This demographic
transition is also starting to occur in the developing world. Do these economic, health and
demographic changes improve the “overall value of our societies,” i.e., their social welfare?
The answer would at first sight seem to be an obvious “yes.”
Upon second thought, however, one may note that these demographic changes may
lead to social and economic pressures on labour markets and on social security systems (to
take two examples), and that some of these pressures may inflict costs on society. There
may also be a limit to which falling fertility rates may be sustainable from the perspective
of long-term sustained economic development.
Perhaps more importantly, from this paper’s normative perspective, is the question of
the extent to which these changes actually increase social welfare. Answering this question
is fundamental to assessing differences in social welfare over time and across societies. It is
also useful for addressing the trade-off that may exist between changes in the quantity (as
measured by longevity and population size) and in the quality (individual welfare in each
period) of welfare along the process of development. Despite the importance of the topic,
the literature has largely ignored that trade-off. Social welfare is traditionally evaluated in
a timeless framework, based solely on quality of life (usually captured by living standards)
and ignoring the quantity of it (longevity and population size). The main objective of this
paper is thus to explore the normative elements of this trade-off by setting up a social
evaluation framework that can be used to account jointly for population size, longevity
and the distribution of periodic welfare.
1.2 Literature
Blackorby et al. (1995, 1996a,b, 1997a,b) provide seminal contributions to intertemporal
social evaluation. They consider two types of social evaluation functions (SEF): those
based on Classical Generalized Utilitarianism (CGU) and those based on Critical Level
Generalized Utilitarianism (CLGU). CGU defines social welfare as a double sum of trans-
formed periodic utilities across individuals and time. The problem with classical util-
itarianism is that it is subject to a repugnant conclusion (Parfit, 1984): with classical
utilitarianism, a sufficiently large population will necessarily be deemed better than any
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other smaller population, even when the larger population has very low average utility.
CLGU does not have this flaw since it grants positive contributions to social welfare only
for those whose lives are “worth living.” Its value function is a sum of lifetime utilities
net of the critical level, defined as the level of lifetime utility for an additional individual
that does not affect the social utility function (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1984). It can
be viewed as a sort of ethical threshold for valuing lives in an intertemporal framework.
However, the intertemporal CLGU principles used by Blackorby et al. (1995, 1997a)
introduce another type of repugnant conclusion. An ordering of two individual lifetime
utilities is subject to a temporal repugnant conclusion if it can always evaluate the life of
a sufficiently long-life individual who is destitute in every period to have been better than
that of any richer individual with a shorter life. This conclusion may indeed be deemed
to be repugnant if one feels that longevity is welfare increasing only for those additional
periods that are worth living: ceteris paribus, an increase in longevity should not always
increase social welfare.
This view may also be set in the context of Dalgaard and Strulik (2011), who analyze
the optimal timing of death. Dalgaard and Strulik (2011) develop a model of intertemporal
decision making in which the speed of the aging process — and consequently the time of
death — is endogenously determined by optimal health investments, in part to explain
the Preston curve (e.g. Preston, 1975) of a positive relationship between income and life
expectancy. The earlier literature on optimal health investments (Ehrlich and Chuma,
1990; Grossman, 1972, among others) also generally provides support to the idea that it
is not always desirable, from an individual perspective, to extend a life beyond a certain
length, given that the quality and the length of life may be substitutable in the value of
welfare. The paper extends those arguments to a social evaluation context.
The intertemporal CLGU functions developed by Blackorby et al. (1995, 1997a) further
exhibit a preference for“unfragmented lives”. A preference for unfragmented lives penalizes
population renewal and may encourage some awkward demographic features in the long
run.
1.3 Contribution of paper
In order to satisfy critical-level temporal consistency and indifference towards fragmenta-
tion of lives, and to avoid a temporal repugnant conclusion, this paper adopts a critical-level
procedure applied periodically rather than over a lifetime. This leads to the characteriza-
tion of a critical-level lifetime utility function that values utilities periodically. We develop
two different versions of the function: with and without discounting.
A social evaluation framework that is jointly sensitive to both longevity and economic
growth nicely complements recent changes in the human development evaluation paradigm.
Development objectives have indeed evolved significantly in recent decades, shifting partly
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away from traditional income growth objectives towards broader human development ones.
Longevity and health are prominent objectives among these, as illustrated below in the
first UNDP Human Development Report:
“Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. In principle,
these choices can be infinite and change over time. But at all levels of develop-
ment, the three essential ones are for people to lead a long and healthy life, to
acquire knowledge and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard
of living. If these essential choices are not available, many other opportunities
remain inaccessible” (UNDP, 1990, p. 10.).
UNDP’s stance has been influential in spurring a multidimensional approach to social eval-
uation. What has not been recognized, however, is that there may be trade-offs between
standards of living, longevity and population size. Our proposed intertemporal social
evaluation framework provides such an explicit trade-off.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops an undiscounted
intertemporal social evaluation function. We first set up the methodological framework and
then present and challenge some of the features of existing intertemporal SEFs. We then
develop principles of intertemporal social evaluation and axiomatically characterize the
corresponding value function. Section 3 develops the discounted version of our framework.
We first introduce the discounting principle and link the discounted and undiscounted
frameworks. We then characterize a discounted SEF and a geometrically-discounted one.
Section 4 concludes the paper. Most of the proofs appear in the appendix.
2 Intertemporal social evaluation without discounting
2.1 Notation and methodological framework
This paper is based on the same analytical framework as Blackorby et al. (1996a). Our
approach is welfarist, in that it only uses utilities enjoyed by individuals during the period
of evaluation. A social state x ∈ X is defined by a matrix of utilities M ∈ M that
gives utilities for each individual in each period. We define M = {ui,j}i∈N ;j∈T , where
N = {1, 2, ..., n} is the set of individuals and T = {1, 2, ..., T} is the time frame being
evaluated. Thus, the total number of individuals is n and the last period of evaluation is
T . The periods can be days, months, years, etc.
Individuals have different dates of birth and different lengths of life. Period 1 corre-
sponds to the date of birth of the first individuals born and period T is the date of death of
the last persons alive. Thus, during the period of evaluation, we could have some individ-
uals not being born yet at the beginning and other ones who die before T . For individuals
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not alive during some periods, the corresponding utilities are blank in the utility matrix
M . An example of such a matrix M is:
Persons\periods 1 2 3 . . T − 1 T
1 u1,2 u1,3 .. .. u1,T−1
2 u2,1 u2,2 u2,3
3 u3,. u3,. u3,T−1 u3,T
. u.,1 u.,2 u.,3 u.,. u.,.
. u.,2 u.,3
n un,1 un,2 un,3 .. .. un,T−1 un,T
Our main goal here is to define a social ordering R that can be used to rank the
different elements ofM. In the process, we would like to characterize a well-defined social
evaluation function W n,T , representing R.
2.2 Principles of intertemporal social evaluation
A natural starting point adopts a two-step aggregation approach, first, to generate a
lifetime utility function V representing an individual ordering RI , and, second, to ag-
gregate the vectors of lifetime utilities and obtain the social evaluation function W n,T .
This approach is widespread in the literature: Blackorby et al. (1995, 1996a, 1997a,b);
Maasoumi and Zandvakili (1986); Salas and Rabadan (1998). It leads to the following
intertemporal classical generalized utilitarian function:
W (u) =
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
g(uit). (1)
Blackorby et al. (1996a) justify this through two different temporal consistency ax-
ioms, the full temporal consistency and the forward looking consistency axioms. The full
temporal consistency axiom states that social evaluation should not be affected by the
order of aggregation of the matrix of utilities (lines then columns or columns then lines),
under certain conditions. This axiom requires the ranking of two utility matrixes, which
differ only by their tth column of utilities, to be the same regardless of whether they are
ordered using a regular intertemporal social ordering R or a social ordering Rt in each
period that only considers the welfare information in that same period t. Blackorby et al.
(1996a) show that if this axiom is combined with traditional welfarist axioms — the strong
Pareto, continuity and anonymity axioms — the resulting social evaluation function fits
within Classical Generalized Utilitarianism. Their forward looking consistency axiom leads
to the same result. The forward looking consistency axiom requires the ranking of any
two states that differ only from period t to be the same under the regular social ordering
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R and a forward-looking social ordering R+t that considers only the temporal information
from period t onwards.
Unfortunately, Classical Generalized Utilitarianism is subject to a so-called “repugnant
conclusion”. The fact that classical (or total) utilitarianism may suffer from a “repugnant
conclusion” is now widely known in welfare economics and has been popularized by Parfit
(1984):
“For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high
quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose
existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members
have lives that are barely worth living” (Parfit, 1984, p.388).
To avoid Parfit’s repugnant conclusion, a timeless CLGU principle is developed in
Blackorby and Donaldson (1984). Its intertemporal version is characterized in Blackorby et al.
(1995) using the traditional welfarist axioms (more on this below) and an axiom called
Independence of the Utility of the Dead (IUD).1 Unlike Blackorby et al. (1996a) who use
a two-dimensional matrix of utilities, the intertemporal CLGU function considers a single
vector of lifetime utilities. Blackorby et al. (1996a) also invoke an individual welfarism
axiom to make lifetime utility equal to a sum of periodic utilities. According to this, all
positive utilities are necessarily welfare increasing at the individual level; a person prefers
to live an additional unit of life as long as the utility in this additional period is positive.
The CLGU value function is then:
W (u) =
∑
i∈N
[g(ui)− g(α)], (2)
where ui is the lifetime utility of individual i (assumed to be the sum of periodic utilities)
and α is the critical level.
The additive formulation is a consequence of the “Independence of the Utility of the
Dead” axiom. Removing past utilities which are common to two given alternatives must
not change their social ranking. The axiom seems particularly useful when comparing two
social states with a common past:
“Suppose that, in any two alternatives, the same individuals are born and
die before period t and have the same birthdates, lengths of life, and lifetime
utilities. Independence of the Utility of the Dead requires that, if these in-
dividuals are removed from the alternatives in question, the social ranking is
unchanged”(Blackorby et al., 1995).
1This is referred to later in Blackorby et al. (2005) as the “Independence of the Existence of the Dead”
axiom.
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Only the utilities of those individuals living at least one period beyond the present
may enter the social evaluation exercise. Unfortunately, this specification of the CLGU
principle exhibits some undesirable features that we discuss in the following subsection.
2.3 Alternative principles for intertemporal social evaluation
This section identifies additional proprieties that the individual ordering RI and the social
ordering R may have to satisfy and their implications for the specification of individual
utility and social evaluation functions. The objective is to extend the literature’s existing
methods based on some incompatibility between existing functions and some desirable
social evaluation principles as well as to provide alternative social evaluation functions.
Identifying the set of all candidate value functions may also be useful, such as when
performing robustness checks and dominance tests.
The above discussion suggests a temporal formulation of the repugnant conclusion.
Definition 1. (Temporal repugnant conclusion)
An individual ordering RI is subject to a temporal repugnant conclusion if it can always
rank a poor individual with a sufficiently long life as necessarily better off than a richer
one whose length of life is shorter.
The temporal repugnant conclusion arises whenever an individual i is deemed better
off than another individual j simply because his life is sufficiently longer than that of j,
regardless of how low his average utility may be. It may instead be believed that longevity
is not always welfare increasing, and that it may be so only for those additional periods
worth living.
Critical-level temporal consistency
A tension can also exist between periodic welfarism and application of the critical level
principle over the course of a lifetime. Periodic assessments of welfare may indicate that a
life is worth living during every period of the life (with utilities at every period sufficiently
above the periodic critical level), even in cases where the application of a lifetime critical
level (applied over the distribution of lifetime utilities) indicates that the life, considered
as a whole, may not be worth living if lifetime utility is below the lifetime critical level.
To see this better, let g(u) = u and consider a person with positive utilities uit ≥ α, Ti
being his life duration and Tα being some fixed lifetime critical level. Periodic welfarism
stipulates that every period of this person’s life is worth living, whereas the lifetime critical-
level principle may lead to the conclusion that his life, considered as a whole, is not worth
living (given that his lifetime utility
∑
t uit may be below Tα but above Tiα). A set of
consistent periodic and temporal principles should arguably be used.
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Definition 2. (Critical-level temporal consistency)
A social ordering R and an individual ordering RI satisfy critical-level temporal
consistency if their intertemporal evaluation of a life is consistent from both periodic and
intertemporal perspectives.
This means that a life with periods deemed as worth living must be deemed as worth living
from an intertemporal perspective as well. Although we believe that this is a reasonable
property, it will not be used to help characterize the results below. The property is,
however, consistent with these results.
Indifference towards fragmentation of lives
“Live simply so that others may simply live.” This assertion by the famous Indian leader
Gandhi alludes to the trade-off that may exist between individual quality of life, longevity
and population size. One interpretation is that one should be willing to sacrifice one’s own
wellbeing for the benefit of others. Another is that sacrifices in living standards should
be made in order to allow for the existence of others. Yet one more interpretation is that
sacrifices in longevity should also be envisaged in order for others to enjoy a life too. This
last interpretation, however, stands in opposition to the principle of favoring unfragmented
lives that characterizes the function developed in Blackorby et al. (1995). Later, in 2005,
the authors state that:
“Preventing someone’s death is more important than bringing about new lives
when the consequences for total utility are the same” (Blackorby et al., 2005,
p.153).
This means that, as long as total utility remains unchanged, one strictly prefers a situation
x in which one person lives 100 years rather than a situation y in which this person lives
50 years and is subsequently replaced by another person who lives the remaining 50 years,
with utilities equal to those of the person in alternative x. Moreover:
“If a population principle’s same-number sub-principles are utilitarian, a posi-
tive critical level has the effect of giving weight to unfragmented lives”(Blackorby et al.,
2005, p.151).
As shown below, a population principle whose same-number sub-principles are utili-
tarian may nevertheless exhibit indifference towards the fragmentation of lives, even with
a positive critical level. Moreover, from a normative perspective, giving weight to un-
fragmented lives may be inconsistent with aversion to inequality, as acknowledged by
Blackorby et al. (2005):
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“If a principle has same-number sub-principles that are inequality averse gener-
alized utilitarian, weight may not be given to unfragmented lives even if critical
levels are positive” (Blackorby et al., 2005, p.152).
One solution is to position social evaluation functions on the frontier between a pref-
erence for longevity (through a preference for unfragmented lives) and a preference for
population renewal (through aversion to inequality of lifetime utilities).
Definition 3. (Indifference towards fragmentation of lives)
Let x be a social state of n individuals with a matrix of utilities ({uit}i∈N ;t∈T ), and let
x̂ be another social state obtained from x by replacing an arbitrary person j in an arbitrary
period l with a new person k who has the same utilities in the remaining periods as those
of person j in x. Thus, the utility matrix x̂ is as follows: for all i 6= k, j, ûi,t = ui,t and for
t ≥ l, ûk,t = uj,t. A social ordering R satisfies indifference towards fragmentation
of lives if it ranks x and x̂ as equally good.
Example 1. Consider a social state x defined by the utility matrix Mx in Figure 1. Two
individuals are alive in x and have a total utility of 3. Let y be another social state identical
to x except that person 1 in x is replaced in the second period by a new person with the same
utilities over the remaining periods. The total utility of the population remains unchanged
while the total population increases from two to three persons.
Figure 1: Illustrative utility matrix: Indifference towards fragmentation of lives
Mx =
1 1
1
My =
1
1
1
Indifference towards fragmentation of lives states that x and y are equally good from
a social perspective; favoring unfragmented lives implies that x is socially better than y.
2.4 The periodic CLGU social evaluation function in a non-discounted
framework
To satisfy critical-level temporal consistency, indifference towards fragmentation of lives,
and to avoid the temporal repugnant conclusion, a critical-level procedure set in each
period rather than over the lifetime is now proposed. This leads to the characterization
of a critical-level individual lifetime utility function that values life periodically.
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2.4.1 A critical-level lifetime utility function
To set up a critical-level lifetime utility function, we need a suitable intertemporal defini-
tion of the critical level before characterizing a critical-level individual ordering RI .
Definition 4. For an individual i born in si and living Ti periods, the periodic critical-
level αsi+Ti is the level of periodic utility that does not affect the social welfare function
when enjoyed by person i in an additional period of life. Thus, an additional period of
life is welfare increasing if the new utility is above αsi+Ti , and conversely it is welfare
decreasing if the new utility is below αsi+Ti .
Let ui be the utility vector of an individual i who is born in si and dies in si + Ti:
ui = (ui,si+1 , ui,si+2 , ..., usi+Ti). The periodic critical level is defined such that this person is
indifferent to the extension of his life by one period in which he would enjoy a utility level
of αsi+Ti . This means that (ui,si+1 , ui,si+2 , ..., usi+Ti) I (ui,si+1 , ui,si+2 , ..., usi+Ti , αsi+Ti),
where I denotes the indifference ordering. This statement is reminiscent of the popular
saying that: “Life is not measured by the number of breaths we take but by the moments
that take our breath away” (anonymous quote featured in Schultz 2003’s bestseller travel
book). Longevity (or the number of breaths) itself does not matter as such, except for
those good moments lived periodically. From this perspective, the critical level subdivides
moments in one’s life into two categories: those that “take our breath away” (sufficiently
so!) and those that do not.
We move towards defining an individual ordering RI by positing the individual version
of the three usual welfarism axioms: strong Pareto, anonymity and continuity.
Definition 5. (Individual strong Pareto) For any individuals i and j, respectively with
utility vectors ({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) and ({uj,sj+t}1≤t≤Tj ) where si and sj are the birthdates of
i and j and Ti = Tj is their length of life,
1. If, for all t ∈ {1, 2, ..., Ti}, ui,si+t = uj,sj+t, then i and j are equally well off.
2. If, for all t ∈ {1, 2, ..., Ti}, ui,si+t ≥ uj,sj+t, with at least one strict inequality, then
individual i is better off than individual j.
The individual strong Pareto axiom implies individual Pareto indifference, which is
defined by point 1 in definition 5 above. The individual Pareto indifference axiom requires
individual rankings to depend only on the periodic utilities of individuals. As long as the
periodic utilities of two individuals with the same length of life are equal, the evaluation
of their lifetime welfare must also be the same.
Definition 6. (Temporal anonymity)
Consider an individual i with utility vector ({ui,t}t∈Ti) and another individual j whose
utility vector is obtained by a permutation of elements of ({ui,t}t∈Ti). The utility vector of
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j is thus given by uj,t = ui,ρ(t) for all t where ρ : Ti 7−→ Ti is a permutation of elements
of Ti. The individual ordering RI satisfies temporal anonymity if it ranks i and j as
equally well off.
This axiom is a consequence of the absence of discounting in an intertemporal social
evaluation. The evaluation periods are equally weighted and the resulting ordering RI is
not affected by the timing of utilities.
We also assume that the individual ordering RI satisfies continuity, which ensures
the existence of a continuous value function representing the ordering RI (Debreu, 1959).
Relaxing the assumption of continuity may lead to situations in which small changes in
periodic utilities can cause large changes in lifetime welfare; a feature that is plausibly
undesirable.
Definition 7. (Continuity of RI)
For all T˜ 6= ∅, the restriction on the ordering RI to {i ∈ I|T = T˜ } is continuous in
periodic utilities, where I is the set of individuals (both existing and future persons), and
T the number of periods individuals are alive for.
Defining i∅ as a non-existing person (the null alternative), and assuming that α∅ exists,
there is indifference between a society with nobody alive and a society where one individual
lives one period with a utility of α∅. Following the same argument as in Blackorby et al.
(1995), and given continuity of RI , the non existence of α∅ would imply that a society
with one person alive is always better than a society with nobody alive, no matter how
miserable this person might be, or conversely, it would imply that a society with one
person is always worse off than a society with nobody alive, no matter how well off this
person is. These two eventualities are ruled out by assuming the existence of α∅.
The individual strong Pareto, temporal anonymity and continuity axioms lead to a
lifetime utility function representing the ordering RI . The lifetime utility function denoted
by V is defined on the set of periodic utility vectors U :
V : U −→ R (3)
ui −→ V (ui) = V ({uit}t∈Ti). (4)
Definition 8. (Equally-Distributed Equivalent Utility)
Let {uit}t∈Ti be the utility vector of person i. The equally-distributed equivalent
utility (EDEU) ui is defined as the level of utility that, if enjoyed by person i at every
period of his life, makes person i indifferent to {uit}t∈Ti , his actual utility vector.
Thus, V (ui1Ti) = V ({uit}t∈Ti), where 1Ti is a vector of dimension Ti whose elements
are all equal to 1. The continuity and increasingness of V ensure the existence of the
10
EDEU, which can be defined by:
ui = Υ
Ti({uit}t∈Ti). (5)
The rank of individual i is thus entirely determined by (Ti, ui) and we obtain:
V ({uit}t∈T ) = V (Ti, ui) = V (Ti,Υ
Ti({uit}t∈Ti)). (6)
The periodic critical-level principle implies that
V (Ti + 1,Υ
Ti+1({uit}t∈T , αsi+Ti)) = V (Ti,Υ
Ti({uit}t∈T )) (7)
where αsi+Ti is the periodic critical-level of individual i.
In addition to these axioms, we use a temporal independence axiom similar to the axiom
of independence of the utility of unconcerned individuals (for timeless social ranking). This
will generate additive separability of the lifetime utility function representing RI .
Definition 9. (Independence of the utility of unconcerned periods (IUUP))
For all P ⊆ {1, 2, ..., T}, and for all utility vectors ui, uj ∈ ℜ
T and ui′ , uj′ ∈ ℜ
T ′, with
T ′ =| P |, if uit = ujt for all t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}\P, and uil = ui′l and ujl = uj′l for all l ∈ P,
then uiRIuj ⇔ ui′RIuj′.
Example 2. Consider two individuals i and j with utility vectors ui and uj. Let i
′ and j′
be two other individuals whose utility vectors are obtained respectively from ui and uj by
removing the two last elements that happen to be identical for ui and uj:
ui = (1, 4, 1, 2, 2, 4);uj = (1, 2, 1, 3, 2, 4)
ui′ = (1, 4, 1, 2);uj′ = (1, 2, 1, 3)
IUUP implies that i is deemed better off than j if and only if i′ is deemed better off
than j′.
IUUP stipulates that the ranks of two given individuals remain unchanged if periods
in which they enjoy the same level of utilities are ignored. This condition implies that the
individually representative utility functions must be additively separable.
Lemma 1. The individual strong Pareto, temporal anonymity and continuity axioms along
with the independence of the utility of unconcerned periods imply that, for all Ti, the EDEU
function ΥTi is additively separable and can be written as:
ΥTi({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) = g
−1
(
1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
g(ui,si+t)
)
(8)
where g : ℜ 7−→ ℜ is continuous and increasing and g(0) = 0.
We use this lemma to characterize the critical-level lifetime utility function as follows.
11
Theorem 1. The ordering RI satisfies individual strong Pareto, temporal anonymity, con-
tinuity and IUUP if and only if, for all individuals i and j with utility vectors {ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti ,
{uj,sj+t}1≤t≤Tj ∈ U\{u∅},
iRIj ⇔
Ti∑
t=1
[g(ui,si+t)− g(α)] ≥
Tj∑
t=1
[g(uj,sj+t)− g(α)], (9)
where f : ℜ 7−→ ℜ is continuous and increasing, g(0) = 0 and α ∈ ℜ. If {ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti or
{uj,sj+t}1≤t≤Tj is u∅, the relevant element in the summation series in (9) is replaced by
zero.
This means that, in a non-discounted framework, the ordering RI satisfies individual
strong Pareto, continuity and IUUP if and only if it can be represented by the following
critical-level lifetime utility function:
Vα(ui) =
∑
t∈Ti
[g(uit)− g(α)], (10)
where g : ℜ 7−→ ℜ is continuous and increasing, g(0) = 0 and α ∈ ℜ. Lifetime utility
is thus a sum of transformed periodic utilities net of the periodic critical level, and an
increase in life duration increases V if and only if the new periodic values of uit are greater
than α.
2.4.2 A periodic CLGU social evaluation function
The next step is to define a social evaluation function that obeys principles for aggregating
the lifetime welfare obtained in (10). Since lifetime welfare is a function of a critical level,
we now have something that can be considered as a value function (the simple sum of
lifetime welfare) without being subject to the repugnant conclusion at the population
level. To aggregate individual lifetime welfare, we assume that the social ordering R
ranking lifetime utility vectors satisfies the usual welfarist axioms characterizing classical
utilitarianism: the strong Pareto, anonymity, continuity and independence of the utility
of unconcerned individuals axioms.
Corollary 1. In a non-discounted framework where lifetime utilities are computed using
periodic critical levels, the social ordering R satisfies Classical Utilitarianism (the strong
Pareto and anonymity axioms and the independence of the utilities of unconcerned indi-
viduals) if and only if, for all utility matrices M , M̂ ∈ M\{M∅},
MRM̂ ⇔
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T i
[g(uit)− g(α)] ≥
∑
i∈N̂
∑
t∈T̂i
[g(uit)− g(α)], (11)
where g : ℜ 7−→ ℜ is continuous and increasing, g(0) = 0, α ∈ ℜ, and, if M or M̂ is M∅,
the appropriate element in the sum (11) is replaced with zero.
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Proof. The result follows directly from Theorem (1) and the characterization of generalized
utilitarianism given in Theorem 5 (pp. 561–562) of Blackorby et al. (2002).
Note that if we wish to incorporate inequality aversion in the distribution of utilities
(temporal and individual), the function g can be chosen to be concave.
3 Intertemporal social evaluation in a discounting frame-
work
This section explores the discounted version of the social evaluation functions developed
previously. To do so, we first present the two birthdate-dependent social evaluation func-
tions developed in the literature and propose an alternative date-dependent value function,
which escapes the temporal repugnant conclusion, satisfies critical-level temporal consis-
tency and exhibits an indifference towards fragmentation of lives.
Discounting in intertemporal social evaluation procedures is a source of controversy.
The three main procedures are based on positive, negative and zero discounting. Positive
discounting is commonly practiced in modern macroeconomics and in most of decision-
making theories analyzing agents’ intertemporal behaviour. Positive discounting gives
utilities increasingly low weights over time; it relies largely on the assumption that, ceteris
paribus, agents prefer to enjoy utilities today rather than to delay them for tomorrow, thus
displaying a preference for the present.
Some advocate a totally opposite view and apply negative discounting (see for instance
Loewenstein and Prelec, 2000a,b), arguing for example that agents prefer a trend of in-
creasing living standards and a “good” end, rather than decreasing living standards and a
“bad” end. This negative discounting view is reminiscent of the popular saying that “All
is well that ends well”: as long as one’s life experience has a good end, it must be deemed
as good when taken as a whole.
Between these two opposite views is the view that social discounting (positive or neg-
ative) necessitates non-welfarist information (such as birthdates and lengths of life), and
is therefore inconsistent with welfarism (see for instance Blackorby et al., 1995, 1997a,b;
Cowen and Parfit, 1992). In this absence of consensus, we now generalize the above frame-
work to allow for different views on the importance of discounting.
3.1 Principles of intertemporal social evaluation in a discounting frame-
work
3.2 Date-adjusted periodic utilities
To take into account possible time preferences, we define date-adjusted utilities, namely,
utilities net of possible time effects.
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Definition 10. (Date-adjusted periodic utilities)
For an individual i with utility vector ({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti), date-adjusted periodic util-
ities ({u0i,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) are periodic utilities purged of possible time effects:
u0i,si+t = φsi+t(ui,si+t), (12)
where, for all l ∈ Z+, φl : is a bijection of ℜ 7−→ ℜ.
The next goal is to characterize φl for all l ∈ Z+.
Definition 11. (Date-adjusted individual strong Pareto)
Let any two individuals i and j respectively have ({u0i,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) and ({u
0
j,sj+t
}1≤t≤Tj )
as date-adjusted utility vectors, where si and sj are respectively the birthdates of i and j
and Ti = Tj are their lengths of life.
1. If, for all t ∈ {1, 2, ..., Ti}, u
0
i,si+t
= u0j,sj+t, then i and j are equally well off.
2. If, for all t ∈ {1, 2, ..., Ti}, u
0
i,si+t
≥ u0j,sj+t, with at least one strict inequality, then
individual i is better off than individual j.
The date-adjusted individual strong Pareto axiom implies date-adjusted individual
Pareto indifference, which is defined above in 1 in definition 11. Date-adjusted individual
Pareto indifference requires the individual ranking to depend only on the date-adjusted
periodic utilities of individuals. If the date-adjusted periodic utilities of two persons are
equal, then their lifetime welfare must be the same.
Definition 12. (Date-adjusted anonymity)
Consider an individual i having a date-adjusted utility vector ({u0i,t}t∈Ti), and another
individual j whose date-adjusted utility vector can be obtained by a permutation of elements
of ({u0i,t}t∈Ti). The individual ordering RI satisfies date-adjusted anonymity if it ranks
i and j as equally well off.
The discounted social evaluation function denoted by Vd is defined on the set of periodic
utility vectors U and the set of dates T :
Vd : U −→ R (13)
ui −→ Vd(li, ui) = Vd({lt}t∈Ti , {ui,t}t∈Ti) = V
0
d ({u
0
i,t}t∈Ti). (14)
This can be transformed to compute an Equally Distributed Equivalent Utility.
Definition 13. (The date-adjusted Equally-Distributed Equivalent Utility)
Let {uit}t∈Ti be the utility vector of person i. The date-adjusted individual rep-
resentative utility udi is defined as the level of date-adjusted utility that, if enjoyed by
person i at every period of his life, makes i indifferent to {u0it}t∈Ti , his actual date-adjusted
utility vector.
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Thus, V 0d (u
0
i 1Ti) = V
0
d ({u
0
i,t}t∈Ti), where 1Ti is a vector of dimension Ti whose elements
are all equal to 1. The continuity and increasingness of V 0d ensure the existence of the
date-adjusted EDEU, defined by:
u0i = Υ
Ti
d ({u
0
i,t}t∈Ti). (15)
The rank of individual i is completely determined by (Ti, u
0
i ), and we obtain:
V 0d ({ui,t}t∈T ) = V
0
d(Ti, u
0
i ) = V
0
d(Ti,Υ
Ti
d ({u
0
i,t}t∈Ti)). (16)
The critical-level principle implies that:
V
0
d(Ti + 1,Υ
Ti+1
d ({u
0
i,t}t∈T , α
0
si+Ti)) = V
0
d(Ti,Υ
Ti
d ({u
0
i,t}t∈T )) (17)
where α0si+Ti is the date-adjusted periodic critical level of person i.
Lemma 2. The date-adjusted individual strong Pareto, date-adjusted anonymity and con-
tinuity axioms, together with IUUP, imply that, for all Ti, the discounted individual rep-
resentative utility function ΥTid is additively separable and can be written as:
ΥTid ({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) = f
−1
(
1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
h(si + t, ui,si+t)
)
(18)
where f : ℜ 7−→ ℜ is continuous and increasing, f(0) = 0 and h(t, ui,t) = f(φt(ui,t)).
From this, we characterize the discounted lifetime utility function as follows.
Theorem 2. The ordering RI satisfies the date-adjusted individual strong Pareto, date-
adjusted anonymity, continuity and IUUP axioms if and only if, for all individuals i and
j with utility vectors {ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti , {uj,sj+t}1≤t≤Tj ∈ U\{u∅},
iRIj ⇔
Ti∑
t=1
[f(φsi+t(ui,si+t))− f(φsi+t(αsi+t))] ≥
Tj∑
t=1
[f(φsj+t(uj,sj+t))− f(φsj+t(αsj+t))],
(19)
where f : ℜ 7−→ ℜ is continuous and increasing, f(0) = 0, αt ∈ ℜ for all t, and if
{ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti or {uj,sj+t}1≤t≤Tj equals u∅, the appropriate element in the sum in (19) is
replaced with zero.
Theorem 2 says that, in a discounted framework, the ordering RI satisfies the date-
adjusted individual strong Pareto, date-adjusted anonymity, continuity and IUUP axioms
if and only if it can be represented by the following discounted critical-level lifetime welfare
function:
Vd(ui) = Vd({uit}t∈Ti) =
Ti∑
t=1
[f(φsi+t(ui,si+t))− f(φsi+t(αsi+t))], (20)
where f : ℜ 7−→ ℜ is continuous and increasing, f(0) = 0 and αt ∈ ℜ for all t.
Lifetime utility is thus a sum of transformed periodic utilities net of the periodic critical
level, and an increase in life duration increases Vd if and only if the new time-adjusted
periodic values of uit are above αt.
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3.3 Geometric discounting of periodic utilities
In order to simplify the above to a geometric discounting form of periodic utilities, we
adapt the stationarity axiom introduced by Blackorby et al. (1997a) to the individual
ordering RI . This stationarity axiom in the case of individual rankings can be defined as
follows.
Definition 14. (Stationarity with respect to RI) Let i and j be two individuals with
utility vectors ({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) and ({uj,sj+t}1≤t≤Tj ), where si and sj are the birthdates
of i and j, and Ti and Tj are their lengths of life. If i
′ and j′ are two other individuals,
identical to i and j in all respects except that they are born r periods later, then si′ = si+r
and sj′ = sj + r. Assume that for all t, ui′,si′+t = ui,si+t and uj′,sj′+t = uj,sj+t. Then
iRIj ⇔ i
′RIj
′.
Stationarity with respect to RI thus requires that the ranking of two individuals re-
mains unchanged if their dates of birth are translated by the same time constant.
Theorem 3. The ordering RI satisfies the date-adjusted individual strong Pareto, date-
adjusted temporal anonymity, continuity, IUUP and stationarity axioms if and only if, for
all individuals i and j with utility vectors respectively equal to {ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti , {uj,sj+t}1≤t≤Tj
∈ U\{u∅},
iRIj ⇔
Ti∑
t=1
δsi+t[g(ui,si+t)− g(αsi+t)] ≥
Tj∑
t=1
δsj+t[g(uj,sj+t)− g(αsj+t)], (21)
where g : ℜ 7−→ ℜ is continuous and increasing, g(0) = 0, δ ∈ ℜ++, αt ∈ ℜ for all t, and,
if {ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti or {uj,sj+t}1≤t≤Tj is u∅, the relevant elements in (21) are replaced with
zero.
3.4 Discounted periodic CLGU social evaluation functions
The next step is to define a social evaluation function that aggregates the lifetime utilities
obtained in the previous step. As above, we do this by assuming that the social ordering
R ranking all the vectors of discounted lifetime utilities satisfies the usual welfarist axioms
of classical utilitarianism (strong Pareto, anonymity, continuity and independence of the
utility of unconcerned individuals (IUUI)).
Corollary 2. In an individual lifetime welfare evaluation framework in which discounting
is applied geometrically using periodic critical levels, the social ordering R satisfies the
traditional axioms of classical utilitarianism (strong Pareto, anonymity and IUUI) if and
only if, for all utility matrices M , M̂ ∈ M\{M∅},
MRM̂ ⇔
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T i
δsi+t[g(ui,t)− g(αsi+t)] ≥
∑
i∈N̂
∑
t∈T̂i
δsi+t[g(ui,t)− g(αsi+t)], (22)
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where g : ℜ 7−→ ℜ is continuous and increasing, g(0) = 0, δ ∈ ℜ++ and αt ∈ ℜ for all t,
and if M or M̂ is M∅, the appropriate sum in (22) is replaced with zero.
Proof: The result follows directly from Theorem 3 and the characterization of gener-
alized utilitarianism given in Theorem 5 (pp. 561–562) of Blackorby et al. (2002).
4 Conclusion
Development processes and policies have led to important demographic and economic
changes worldwide, most importantly a fall in fertility, a growth in longevity and a general
growth in living standards. This has had significant impacts on what can be termed
the “quality”, the “quantity” and the “duration” of life. It seems reasonable that all such
three aspects of human lives should be an input into the evaluation of intertemporal social
welfare.
The paper derives two sets of individual and social orderings (one with discounting
and the other without) that take into account these three aspects of human lives. These
orderings avoid a temporal form of the repugnant conclusion through the use of strictly
positive levels of periodic critical levels, αt > 0. The orderings further satisfy the prop-
erties of critical-level temporal consistency and of indifference towards fragmentation of
lives. Critical-level temporal consistency ensures that periodic assessments of welfare are
coherent with lifetime ones. Indifference towards fragmentation of lives positions social
evaluation functions at the frontier between a preference for longevity and a preference
for population renewal, ceteris paribus. These, we believe, are useful properties of social
welfare evaluation procedures in an intertemporal context.
In its simplest form, the paper’s social welfare framework is based on the following
individual ordering function (consider (10)):
Vα(ui) =
∑
t∈Ti
g(uit)− Tig(α), (23)
where g is a transformation of periodic utilities uit and of a periodic critical level α, where
Ti is i’s longevity, and where i’s lifetime function of the critical level is Tig(α). That
framework can be extended to make the contribution of the quality of life depend upon
the time at which that life is observed. That can be done using different critical levels for
different calendar years. In (22), this is done by using αsi+t for α. The framework could
also be generalized by using αsi,si+t instead of αsi+t, which would allow for the critical
level to depend both upon the time at which the life is lived and upon the year in which
the person is born. (Such a type of time and birthdate discrimination is also implicit in the
discounting procedures observed in (22)). If the same weight should be used on the quality
of life regardless of the time at which it is lived, then there should be no discounting and
the same critical level should be used across all periods.
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Most importantly perhaps, the social evaluation functions derived in this paper enable
capturing the potentially complex trade-offs between longevity, population size and living
standards — trade-offs that can exist when assessing development and public policies in
the presence of limited resources. The paper’s social evaluation functions trade off the
quality of life across individuals in the traditional manner, e.g., through imposing concav-
ity on the g function. This enables incorporating inequality aversion into intertemporal
social evaluation. The trade-off between quality and quantity of life arises through the
summation of differences between functions g of individual welfare and the same function
of the critical level, α — as opposed to just taking the average of periodic individual
welfare functions, as has been traditionally done in welfare economics. This makes it pos-
sible to prefer a larger population to a smaller population with higher average individual
welfare, if the additional lives of the larger population enjoy levels of living standards
that exceed the critical level. The trade-off between the quantity and the longevity of life
arises through a periodic summation of differences between g(u) and g(α), these differ-
ences making use of periodic critical levels. A population with shorter-lived individuals
may then be found preferable to one with longer lives if the quantity of lives in the first
population is sufficiently large to offset the welfare value of higher longevity in the second
population. A greater-longevity population may alternatively be found preferable to one
with higher fertility if the first population’s longer-life individuals enjoy sufficiently large
levels of periodic quality of life over a sufficiently longer time horizon.
Appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. For Ti ≥ 3, consider two individuals i and j born respectively at dates si and
sj and with Ti and Tj as lengths of life and ({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) and ({uj,sj+t}1≤t≤Tj ) as
utility vectors. Without loss of generality, assume that si ≤ sj. Consider now two other
individuals, i′andj′. i and i′ are identical in every period, have the same birthdate, the
same length of life and the same utility vector. Individual j′ is identical to j except that
he is born at a different date sj′ = si′ = si.
By individual strong Pareto, i and i′ are equally well off, and j and j′ are equally
well off. Let P = {p1, p2, ..., pM} be a subset of {1, 2, ..., Ti}
⋂
{1, 2, ..., Tj} for which
ui′,t = uj′,t for all t ∈ P. By temporal anonymity, periodic utilities could be ranked so as
to have P = {1, 2, ...,M}. IUUP implies that the ranking of i′ and j′ remains unchanged
if ({ui′,si′+t}1≤t≤M ) and ({uj′,sj′+t}1≤t≤M ) are removed from their utility vectors. For
example, consider two new individuals i′′ and j′′ born respectively at dates si′ +M and
sj′+M and whose utility vectors are given by ui′′,t = ui′,t for all t ∈ {M+1,M +2, ..., Ti′}
and uj′′,t = uj′,t for all t ∈ {M + 1,M + 2, ..., Tj′}. By IUUP, i
′RIj
′ ⇔ i′′RIj
′′ and we
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obtain iRIj ⇔ i
′′RIj
′′ and jRI i⇔ j
′′RI i
′′, which is equivalent to
ΥTi({ui,si+t}t∈Ti) ≥ Υ
Tj ({uj,sj+t}t∈Tj )⇔
ΥTi−M ({ui,si+t}t∈Ti\P) ≥ Υ
Tj−M ({uj,sj+t}t∈Tj\P) (24)
and
ΥTj ({uj,sj+t}t∈Tj ) ≥ Υ
Ti({ui,si+t}t∈Ti)⇔
ΥTj−M({uj,sj+t}t∈Tj\P) ≥ Υ
Ti−M({ui,si+t}t∈Ti\P) (25)
where Ti −M = |Ti \ P| and Tj −M = |Tj \ P|.
Following Blackorby et al. (1995) this implies that, in ΥTi , Ti \ P is separable from
its complement and thus that every subset of variables is separable from its complement.
This implies that ΥTi({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) = F
Ti
(
1
Ti
∑Ti
t=1 g
t
Ti
(ui,si+t)
)
, where F Ti and gtTi are
continuous and increasing. The individual strong Pareto axiom is necessary for the addi-
tive separability of ΥTi . Without that requirement, we may have ΥTi({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) =
min({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) that also satisfies IUUP. Symmetry of Υ
Ti implies that each gtTi can
be chosen to be independent of t and by normalization, we can choose gTi(0) = 0. (24)
and (25) imply that gTi , and therefore F
Ti , can be chosen to be independent of Ti. Since
ΥTi(v, ..., v) = v for all v ∈ ℜ, we obtain
ΥTi({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) = g
−1
(
1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
g(ui,si+t)
)
, (26)
where g : ℜ 7−→ ℜ is continuous and increasing and g(0) = 0.
To complete the proof, the case of Ti = 2, 1 and i∅ can be checked by applying the
periodic critical-level principle to utility vectors of dimension less than 3.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Sufficiency is easily checked. To prove necessity, we first establish the existence of
periodic critical-level functions {αsi+Ti |si+Ti ∈ N++}, and show that, in a non-discounted
framework, for all i ∈ I and all (si, Ti) ∈ N
2
++, and all {ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti ∈ ℜ
Ti ,
αsi+Ti({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) = α∅ = α. (27)
To do this, consider an individual i with utility vector {ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti and let i
′ be another
individual identical to i except that he lives for an additional period Ti + 1 with utility
ui′,si+Ti+1 = α. If the original utility vector {ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti is removed from ui and ui′ ,
this leads respectively to u∅ and uα = {α}. Let i∅ be a non-existing individual enjoying
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utility u∅ and let iα be an individual living one period (at an arbitrary date t)
2 with utility
α.
IUUP implies that iRI i
′ ⇔ i∅RI iα and i
′RI i ⇔ iαRI i∅. Since i∅Iiα, we have iIi
′,
meaning that α is the periodic critical level for i. We conclude that αsi+Ti exists for all
i ∈ I and all (si, Ti) ∈ Z
2
++, and (27) is satisfied for all i ∈ I and all Ti ∈ Z++, and all
{ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti ∈ ℜ
Ti .
Now consider two individuals i and j, respectively born at dates si and sj with lengths
of lives Ti and Tj and utility vectors ({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) and ({uj,sj+t}1≤t≤Tj ). Without loss
of generality, assume that Ti ≥ Tj ≥ 3. Let j
′ be an individual that is identical to j,
except that j′ lives T ′j = Ti periods and enjoys a utility of α during each of the additional
(Ti−Tj) periods. Because α is the periodic critical-level, j and j
′ are equally well off, and
we obtain iRIj ⇔ iRIj
′ and jRI i⇔ j
′RI i.
Applying lemma 1, we obtain:
iRIj ⇔ iRIj
′ (28)
⇔ f−1
(
1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
g(ui,si+t)
)
≥ f−1
 1
Ti
 Tj∑
t=1
g(uj,sj+t) + (Ti − Tj)g(α)
 (29)
⇔
Ti∑
t=1
g(ui,si+t) ≥
Tj∑
t=1
g(uj,sj+t) + (Ti − Tj)g(α) (30)
⇔
Ti∑
t=1
[g(ui,si+t)− g(α)] ≥
Tj∑
t=1
[g(uj,sj+t)− g(α)] (31)
and
jRI i⇔
Tj∑
t=1
[g(uj,sj+t)− g(α)] ≥
Ti∑
t=1
[g(ui,si+t)− g(α)] (32)
which implies (9).
A.3. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For Ti ≥ 3, consider two individuals i and j born on dates si and sj with lengths
of life Ti and Tj and with utility vectors ({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) and ({uj,sj+t}1≤t≤Tj ). Their
date-adjusted utility vectors are ({u0i,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) and ({u
0
j,sj+t
}1≤t≤Tj ). Without loss of
generality, assume that si ≤ sj.
Let i′ and j′, two other individuals born on date 0 and with respective date-adjusted
utility vectors ({u0i′,si′+t
}1≤t≤Ti′ ) = ({u
0
i,si+t
}1≤t≤Ti) = ({φsi+t(ui,si+t)}1≤t≤Ti) and ({uj′,sj′+t}1≤t≤Tj′ ) =
({u0j,sj+t}1≤t≤Tj ) = ({φsj+t(uj,sj+t)}1≤t≤Tj ). The date-adjusted individual strong Pareto
axiom means that i and i′ are equally well off, as are j and j′.
2The date does not matter here since we are working in a non-discounted framework.
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Let P = {p1, p2, ..., pM} be a subset of {1, 2, ..., Ti}
⋂
{1, 2, ..., Tj} for which u
0
i′,si′+t
=
u0j′,sj′+t
for all t ∈ P. The date-adjusted anonymity axiom allows date-adjusted periodic
utilities to be ranked to have P = {1, 2, ...,M}. Given that i′ and j′ have the same
date of birth (date 0), IUUP and given the bijectivity of φl, the ranking of i
′ and j′
remains unchanged if ({ui′,si′+t}1≤t≤M ) and ({uj′,sj′+t}1≤t≤M ) are removed from their
utility vectors.
Consider then two new individuals i′′ and j′′ born at date M and whose date-adjusted
utility vectors are given by u0i′′,t = u
0
i′,t for all t ∈ {M + 1,M + 2, ..., Ti′} and u
0
j′′,t = u
0
j′,t
for all t ∈ {M + 1,M + 2, ..., Tj′}. By IUUP and the bijectivity of φl, i
′RIj
′ ⇔ i′′RIj
′′,
and we find iRIj ⇔ i
′′RIj
′′ and jRI i⇔ j
′′RI i
′′, which is equivalent to:
ΥTid ({u
0
i,si+t}t∈Ti) ≥ Υ
Tj
d ({u
0
j,sj+t}t∈Tj )⇔
ΥTi−Md ({u
0
i,si+t}t∈Ti\P) ≥ Υ
Tj−M ({u0j,sj+t}t∈Tj\P) (33)
and
Υ
Tj
d ({u
0
j,sj+t}t∈Tj ) ≥ Υ
Ti
d ({u
0
i,si+t}t∈Ti)⇔
ΥTj−M ({u0j,sj+t}t∈Tj\P) ≥ Υ
Ti−M
d ({u
0
i,si+t}t∈Ti\P), (34)
where Ti −M = |Ti \ P| and Tj −M = |Tj \ P|.
Following the proof of lemma 1, Ti \P in Υ
Ti
d is separable from its complement. There-
fore, every subset of variables is separable from its complement, and this implies that:
ΥTid ({u
0
i,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) = F
Ti
(
1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
f tTi(u
0
i,si+t)
)
, (35)
where F Ti and f tTi are continuous and increasing. The date-adjusted individual strong
Pareto axiom is necessary for additive separability of ΥTid . Without this requirement,
we could have ΥTid ({u
0
i,si+t
}1≤t≤Ti) = min({u
0
i,si+t
}1≤t≤Ti), which also satisfies the IUUP
axiom. Symmetry of ΥTid with respect to the date-adjusted periodic utilities implies that
each f tTi can be chosen to be independent of t and, normalizing, we can choose fTi(0) = 0.
(33) and (34) imply that fTi , and therefore F
Ti , can be chosen to be independent of Ti.
Since ΥTid (v, ..., v) = v for all v ∈ ℜ, we obtain:
ΥTid ({u
0
i,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) = f
−1
(
1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
f(u0i,si+t)
)
(36)
where f : ℜ 7−→ ℜ is continuous and increasing, f(0) = 0.
Substituting φsi+t(ui,si+t) in (35) for u
0
i,si+t
, we obtain
ΥTid ({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti) = f
−1
(
1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
h(si + t, ui,si+t)
)
, (37)
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where f : ℜ 7−→ ℜ is continuous and increasing, f(0) = 0, and h(t, ui,t) = f(φt(ui,t)).
The proof can be extended to the case of Ti = 2, 1 and i∅ by applying the periodic
critical-level principle to utility vectors of dimension less than 3.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Sufficiency is easily checked. To prove necessity, consider two individuals i and j
born on dates si and sj, with lengths of life Ti and Tj, and with utility vectors ({ui,si+t}1≤t≤Ti)
and ({uj,sj+t}1≤t≤Tj ). Without loss of generality, assume that Ti ≥ Tj ≥ 3. Let j
′ be an
individual identical to j except that he lives Tj′ = Ti periods and in every additional period
enjoys the corresponding periodic critical-level utility. Thus, sj′ = sj , uj′,sj′+t = uj,sj+t
for t ≤ Tj and uj′,sj′+t = αsj+t for t > Tj. Since αt is the period t critical-level utility, j
and j′ are equally well off, and we find that: iRIj ⇔ iRIj
′ and jRI i⇔ j
′RI i.
Applying lemma 2, we obtain:
iRIj ⇔ iRIj
′ (38)
⇔ f−1
(
1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
f(φsi+t(ui,si+t))
)
≥ (39)
f−1
 1
Ti
 Tj∑
t=1
f(φsj+t(uj,sj+t)) +
Ti∑
t=Tj+1
f(φsj+t(αsj+t))
 (40)
⇔
Ti∑
t=1
f(φsi+t(ui,si+t))−
Tj∑
t=1
f(φsj+t(αsj+t)) ≥ (41)
Tj∑
t=1
f(uj,sj+t) +
Ti∑
t=Tj+1
f(φsj+t(αsj+t))−
Tj∑
t=1
f(φsj+t(αsj+t)) (42)
⇔
Ti∑
t=1
[f(φsi+t(ui,si+t))− f(φsj+t(αsj+t))] ≥ (43)
Tj∑
t=1
[f(φ((uj,sj+t))− f(φsj+t(αsj+t))]. (44)
Since φsi+t(αsi+t) = α0 = φsj+t(αsj+t), we obtain:
iRIj ⇔
Ti∑
t=1
[f(φsi+t(ui,si+t))− f(φsi+t(αsi+t))] ≥ (45)
Tj∑
t=1
[f(φ((uj,sj+t))− f(φsj+t(αsj+t))], (46)
and, similarly, that:
jRI i⇔
Tj∑
t=1
[f(φ(uj,sj+t))− f(φsj+t(αsj+t))] ≥
Ti∑
t=1
[f(φsi+t(ui,si+t))− f(φsi+t(αsi+t))]
(47)
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which implies (19).
A.5. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Sufficiency is easily verified. To prove necessity, let g(u) = h(0, u) = f(φ0(u)),
where h, f and φ0 are as in the statement of lemma 2 and theorem 2. We must show that:
f(φsi+t(ui,si+t))− f(φsi+t(αsi+t)) = δ
si+t[g(ui,si+t)− g(αsi+t)] (48)
for all (si, t, ui,si+t) ∈ Z
2
+ ×ℜ, where δ ∈ ℜ++.
Consider the sets It, the sets of all individuals i born at date t. Stationarity implies
that the individual ordering induced in these sets are the same for all t because the utility
profile of all the individuals in It can be obtained from individuals in I0 by adding r = t
periods to the birthdate of each person.
Now consider an individual i born on date t and living 2 periods with periodic utilities
ui,t and ui,t+1 which, together with the above remark, implies that
h(t+ r, ui,t+r) + h(t+ r + 1, ui,t+r+1) = Fr(h(t, ui,t) + h(t+ 1, ui,t+1)) (49)
where h(t, ui,t) = f(φt(ui,t)) for all t ∈ Z+. Note that Fr does not depend on t because
the ordering of It is the same for all t.
Define
h(t+ r, z) = h(t+ r, g−1t (z)) = h(t+ r, u), x = h(t, ui,t), y = h(t+ 1, ui,t+1) (50)
where gt(.) = h(t, .).
The following functional equation is then obtained:
h(t+ r, x) + h(t+ 1 + r, y) = Fr(x+ y) (51)
This is a Pexider equation (further details in Acze´l 1966 and Blackorby et al. 1997a). Its
solution is given by
h(t+ r, z) = a(r)z + b(r), (52)
where a and b cannot depend on t because Fr does not and z is an independent variable.
Therefore,
h(t+ r, u) = a(r)h(t, u) + b(r). (53)
Setting t = 0, we find that:
h(r, u) = a(r)g(u) + b(r). (54)
Thus,
h(t+ r, u) = a(t+ r)g(u) + b(t+ r) (55)
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Futhermore, setting r = 0 in (54), it follows that:
h(0, u) = g(u) = a(0)g(u) + b(0). (56)
Because g(0) = 0, this implies that a(0) = 1 and b(0) = 0. Substituting (54) into (53), we
obtain:
h(t+ r, u) = a(r)[a(t)g(u) + b(t)] + b(r). (57)
Combining (55) and (57), it follows that:
a(t+ r)g(u) + b(t+ r) = a(r)[a(t)g(u) + b(t)] + b(r), (58)
which is equivalent to
[a(t+ r)− a(r)a(t)]g(u) = a(r)b(t) + b(r)− b(t+ r). (59)
Because g is increasing and the right-hand side of (59) is independent of u, this requires
that
a(t+ r)− a(r)a(t) = 0 (60)
and that
a(r)b(t) + b(r)− b(t+ r) = 0. (61)
Thus, a(t + r) = a(r)a(t) and b(t + r) = a(r)b(t) + b(r) for all t, r ∈ Z++, Denoting
a(1) = δ, we obtain a(2) = δ2, a(t) = δt, and a(t+ 1) = δt+1. Thus, (54) becomes
h(t, u) = δtg(u) + b(t). (62)
Substituting u by αt, it follows that:
h(t, αt) = δ
tg(αt) + b(t), (63)
which implies that:
b(t) = h(t, αt)− δ
tg(αt). (64)
Substituting in (62), it follows that
h(si + t, ui,si+t) = δ
si+t[g(ui,si+t)− g(αsi+t)] + h(si + t, αsi+t), (65)
or, equivalently, that
f(φsi+t(ui,si+t))− f(φsi+t(αsi+t)) = δ
si+t[g(ui,si+t)− g(αsi+t)], (66)
which is (48).
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